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Organizational Effectiveness Along Life-Cycle 
Stages: A Comparison Of Wendy's 
And McDonald's 
by 
Frederick J. DeMicco 
Division Of Hotel, Restaurant and Institutional Management 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 
"Perceptions of Organizational Effectiveness over Organizational Life 
Cycles, " written by Kim S. Cameron and David S. Whetten, posits a theory 
regarding how organizational effectiveness criteria change as firms develop 
along the life cycle continuum. Induced from observations obtained from 
a simulation game, the Cameron and Whetten theory is applied in this ar- 
ticle to two real organizations, Wendy's and McDonald's, with the inten- 
tion of demonstrating that this theory is applicable in "real life" situations. 
By many accounts, both Wendy's and McDonald's are regarded as 
being successful fast food franchises. The main thrust of this presenta- 
tion involves a depth analysis of Wendy's and McDonald's to determine 
whether their perceptions of where emphasis should be placed to achieve 
effective operation have changed over time. Changes in perceptions of 
organizational effectiveness indicate the validity of taking into account 
changes in life cycle stages and congruent changes in effectiveness criteria 
when performing macro-level organizational research as pointed out by 
Cameron and Whetten. 
The presentation will first develop the life cycle model concept and the 
appropriate model of effectiveness to use depending on the life cycle stage 
as positioned by Cameron and Whetten. Next, the discussion will set forth 
a historical overview of the two companies followed by an analysis of each 
company's effectiveness at both the initial stages of operation and the 
present time. Finally, comparisons and contra-distinctions between the 
focal organizations will be identified and discussed. 
In choosing a theoretical basis for this analysis, attempts were made 
to avoid one of the common pitfalls in organizational research, which, 
simply stated, involves the reliance on or arbitrary selection of a model 
utilized to evaluate organizational effectiveness.' The selection of a 
model of effectiveness should be based on the unique characteristics of 
the focal organization. In other words, organizations are not static, as 
evidenced by the normal changes in events, threats, and opportunities 
at both an external and internal level, which are perceived by the organiza- 
tion as having an important impact on the organization's survival.2 
Therefore, this presentation's use of the Cameron and Whetten Theory 
facilitates the conscious selection of an effectiveness model through the 
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consideration of where the organization falls on the life cycle continuum. 
Cameron and Quinn developed four summary life cycle stages of 
organizations and delineated the characteristics associated with each 
stage by reviewing nine different life cycle models. The first stage, labeled 
the "entrepreneurial stage," is characterized by the organization's "mar- 
shalling of assets, lots of ideas, little planning and coordination and for- 
mation of a niche in the market."3 In this life cycle stage, organizational 
success hinges on its ability to develop external support, acquire 
resources, sustain growth, and remain fle~ible.~ The second life cycle 
stage, termed the "collectivity stage, " which reflects a change in em- 
phasis toward a more "human relations" orientation, is exemplified by 
"high commitment and cohesion among members, face to face com- 
munication and informal structure and a sense of mi~sion."~ The "for- 
malization stage" reveals a dramatic shift in the organizational develop- 
ment because formal goals emerge coupled with an emphasis on produc- 
tivity and effi~iency.~ This stage is characterized by "the formalization 
of rules, stable internal structure, emphasis on efficiency and the institu- 
tionalization of  procedure^."^ In the fourth stage, "elaboration of struc- 
ture," the organization begins to monitor the external environment and 
organizational successes are based on "renewing adaptability, domain 
expansion and establishment of new multipurpose subsystems."8 
While these stages represent only the initial stages of organizational 
development, the research of Cameron and Whetten confirmed that 
organizational characteristics and perceived success criteria change over 
time.9 Consequently, models used to evaluate organizational effec- 
tiveness should change depending on the particular life cycle stage 
typified by the characteristics of the focal organization under review (See 
Figure 1). 
Cameron and Whetten identified the appropriate effectiveness model 
to use depending on the organization's focus on domain of activity (i.e., 
input versus output orientation). Organizations in the early stages of the 
life cycle tend to be more concerned with inputs, which is demonstrated 
by the need to acquire resources and gain external support. Cameron and 
Whetten suggest the use of the systems-resource model when evaluating 
organizations that fall into this category. Organizations in the third and 
fourth stages emphasize outputs demonstrated by their concern for ef- 
ficiency, productivity, and the establishment of formalgoals. Cameron 
and Whetten suggest the use of the goal model in the evaluation of 
organizations which are reaching this level of maturity. 
The systems-resource model's use appears most appropriate when 
evaluating an organization which places considerable emphasis on in- 
puts. The focus on inputs, typical in early stage firms, is partly shaped 
by the high level of environmental turbulence, uncertainty, and complex- 
ity experienced by organizations. In evaluating the focal organization 
using the systems-resource model, the dominant underpinnings of 
organizational effectiveness are resource acquisition and the ability to 
gain external support. Possible resources which the focal organization 
may wish to acquire include inputs such as major food stuffs (i.e., meat 
entree, bread, beverage, etc.. . .), human resources (i.e., direct labor) and 
capital. Thompson (1967) postulated that changes in the environment 
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Figure 1 
The Cameron and Whetten Life-Cycle Model 
SYSTEM RESOLIRCE MODEL 
1. Resource acquisition 
2. The establishment of 
credibility in the market 
3. *Product quality concentration 
Business (System) 
Inputs [technological Core] 
GOAL MODEL 
1. Concern for 
efficiency 
2. Productivity 
3. *Product quantity 
emphasis 
Outputs 
1 1 1 I 
Entrepreneurial Collectivity Formalization Elaboration 
Stage (1) Stage (2) Stage (3) Stage (4) 
In the early stages of the life-cycle (stages 1 and 2), the firm places an emphasis on the input 
sideof the system. The focus is on obtaining resources("raw materials," i.e., food products)and 
producing "quality" products toestablish a niche in the market. At latter stages of the life-cycle 
(stages 3 and 4) the output side receives greater emphasis. Having attained quality standards 
and market share in the early stages, the firm now tries to increase production and efficiency, 
and thus the emphasis shifts to a product "quantity" emphasis. 
can have serious effects on the input side of the technological core system 
and thus can create roadblocks to organizational survival.1° 
One technique that may be used to deal with possible environmental 
input problems is buffering, which involves surrounding the technological 
core with input components. An example of buffering within the con- 
text of this discussion is the negotiation of long term contracts with sup- 
pliers, thereby ensuring the continued infusion of raw materials. The other 
major underpinning involves the organization's ability to gain external 
support through the development of apositiveimage. Olsen and DeNo- 
ble illustrate Wendy's attempt to gain external support by pointingout 
that the firm's early successes are attributable to the promise of better 
quality food than its competition. In sum, the analysis of Wendy's and 
McDonald's in the early stages of development will specifically address 
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how effective they were in acquiring resources and developing a positive 
image. 
As organizations mature, the primary emphasis shifts from input to 
an output orientation (e.g., formalization is higher). During the later 
stages in the life cycle, organizations judge effectiveness on how close 
ly an organization's outputs come to matching its stated goals.ll The 
goals model is most appropriately used in the evaluation of effectiveness 
in firms characterized by an emphasis on outputs. Goals relating to an 
output orientation can be measured in terms of efficiency, of uniform 
quality of product or service, and of productivity. Improvements in ef- 
ficiency and uniformness involve the upgrading of training, equipment, 
and information systems. Additional goals, for example, are satisfying 
environmental constituencies through the coordinated efforts of 
specialized departments like research and development of a new product 
innovation. In other words, through the coordination of the skills inherent 
in these diverse departments, the organization is best positioned to 
achieve certain goals, which may be unattainable without the integrated 
effort of a professional staff. McDonald's introduction of a breakfast 
menu represents the utilization of a smoothing technique'through im- 
provement in technological efficiency by spreading out customer demand 
over a longer period of time.12 While the breakfast concept represented 
an attempt to improve efficiency, its success was more than likely enhanc- 
ed through the concerted efforts of the professional staff. 
This section discusses the theoretical basis for using either the systems- 
resource or goal model of effectiveness evaluation depending on the posi- 
tion of the organization along the life cycle continuum. However, it is 
important to note that the usage of either model in all situations may 
not be appropriate.13 Justification for using the systems-resource model 
in the evaluation of the focal organization lies in the clear correlation ex- 
isting between the resources input into the organization and its finish- 
ed product. The usage of the goal model in later stages of life cycle develop 
ment is somewhat harder to justify. A number of goals were identified 
through research of corporate annualreports, which represents the ma- 
jor source of goal-related data. While the point is made that only official 
goals are discussed, the analysis remains consistent in the treatment of 
both focal organization's goals. 
McDonald's Begins With A Street Plan 
Ray K m  was first introduced to McDonald's in 1954 in San Bernadino, 
California. There he met Richard and Maurice McDonald, the owners 
at that time. He was impressed by what he saw at their restaurant: value, 
speedy service, elimination of wastefulness, cleanliness, and nothing to 
steal.14 When Ray Kroc left California, he had a contract that allowed 
him to sell McDonald's franchises, and he would receive 1.4 percent of 
each franchise's gross sales. 
In 1961 after much trouble with the McDonald brothers, he bought 
the trademarks, copyrights, formulas, golden arches, and the name for 
$2.7 million and enlisted the help of Harry Sonneborn, a former vice 
president of Tastee-Freez, to raise the money. They borrowed it from col- 
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legeendowment funds at ahighinterest rate. By the time Ray Kroc had 
finished repaying this loan, McDonald's had cost him $14 million. 
He wasstartingout in a new market with few competitors. He open- 
ed his first storein Des Plaines, outsideof Chicago, and then sold his first 
franchise, which later opened six stores, in Fresno. California. There was 
acertain image Ray K& wanted a McDonald's restaurant to present, 
that of a clean and wholesome place to eat. His motto was QSCITLC: 
Quality, &-vice. Cleanlinesflender Loving Care. He wanted to sell quali- 
ty productswith fast servicein adeanenvironment, includingrestroorns. 
He wanted to have a business which attracted families. He also tried to 
discourage teenagers as customers. In order to do this. he made the 
restaurant self-service and refused to hue females because they attracted 
the wrongkindof boys. This hiringphilosophy continueduntil 1969, when 
women were first hired as crew members.15 
In order to increase McDonald's profits, Kroc and Sonneborn decid- 
ed to make McDonald's a landlord. To do so they needed $1.5 million 
which they obtained from several New England insurance firms in ex- 
changefor22.5 percentof theMcDonald's stock, which wouldbe worth 
$500 million 10 years later. McDonald's would now build the store and 
furnish it with equipment, then rent it to the franchisee for 8.3 percent 
of the moss sales.l6 
.- .--. n- --- 
After selling his first franchise, Kroc hired Fred Turner to run the day- 
teday operations, including teaching new franchisees the "Ray Kroc 
system," and being sure that it wasfollowed. Later franchis&s and 
restaurant managers would be taught the "system" at Hamburger 
University. Turner was loyal to McDonald's and stayed with thecom- 
pany. In 1973 thisloyalty was repaidwhen hewasnamedchief executive 
officer of thecorporation. Loyalty by suppliers has also been rewarded. 
If asupplier stays withMcDonald's, McDonald'swill stay with that sup 
plier. As McDonald's has grown, so have these loyal suppliers. 
Kroc wanted his restaurants to be the same everywhere. Therefore, 
he enforced rigid standardization at al l  franchises. The 385-page opera- 
tions manual was considered the corporate bible. Eachinnovationmade 
in the menu and the service created more uniformity. Each refinement 
increased standardization. Kroc felt that hecoulddecrease serving time 
by increasing theuniformity of the product. His formula for success in- 
cluded the following things: simple food, quick service, stiff franchise 
fees, cheap labor, a huge outer real estate ring, and faithful suppliers.I7 
This formula has evidently been very successful. 
Kroc maintained a tight rein on his corporation for a long time. He 
wanted franchisees who wouldrun their stomexactly the way he wanted, 
and he felt todo this correctly their totalcommitment was required. Many 
franchisees felt they were simply managers rather than independent 
businessmen. 
In order to increase uniformity throughout the many McDonald's 
restaurants, Kroc started Hamburger University to teach the franchisees 
the exact way things should be done in a McDonald's restaurant. 
Students were taught equipment, products, business controls, interper- 
sonalrelations, equalemployment, energy conservation, andemployee 
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safety. Hamburger University also offered post graduate studies which 
included industry and system changes, marketing, finance, government 
affairs, personnel, and salary and wage administration. In 1982, Ham- 
burger University had graduated 15,000 students.18 
The main objective of McDonald's has always been to serve a quality 
product quickly in a clean environment. Another objective has been con- 
tinued growth which is shown by the fact that each year more 
McDonald's restaurants are opened; in 1982, there were 520 new ones. 
A third objective has been to increase the number of company-owned 
and operated restaurants; in 1982,53 percent of the McDonald's were 
in this category. 
Ray Kroc's "assembly-1ine;hamburger" was a concept with much 
potential which has been greatly cultivated in the last 30 years. The ad- 
dition of products such as the Big Mac in 1968 and the Quarter Pounder 
in 1972 has increased this potential: Astudy once showed that the planet 
could support 12,000 McDonald's restaurants, and they are well on their 
way there.lS In 1982, there were 7,259 McDonald's restaurants in 
operation, and continued growth is expe~ted.~O 
McDonald's Early Cycle Shows Success 
In evaluating the effectiveness of McDonald's in the early stages of 
development through application of the systems-resource model, the 
primary considerations under review include the acquisition of resources 
and the establishment of a positive image. I t  is important to note that 
when Ray Kroc purchased the company 200 restaurants were already 
in existence. Therefore, many of the key input resources were already 
in place. Taking advantage of this situation, Kroc maintained relation- 
ships with specific suppliers, which circumvented potential problems in 
acquiring certain resources (i.e., buffering). These suppliers included Mar- 
tin Brower Corp. (paper and sundry supplies), Harry Smorgan (shorten- 
ing for fryers), Harold Freund (bread), Jack Simplot, "the Idaho Potato 
King" (potatoes), and Golden State Foods Corp. (frozen patties, drink 
syrup, and special sauce.)Z1 Kroc obtained the consistency of materials 
by developing bonds with respectable vendors. This has proved to be 
a successful strategy in that the same suppliers continue to serve the 
corporation today. 
Another key input into the company was the infusion of capital, both 
in terms of acquisition dollars and expansion dollars. Kroc obtained finan- 
cing in the amount of $4.2 million, of which $1.5 million represented 
money used to acquire land, build restaurant units, and furnish them with 
equipment. These additional units were then leased to franchisees for 
an 8.3 percent annual percentage of revenue. By using this purchase 
leaseback method, the company was able to supplement its cash flow 
over and above the normal license fee.22 The improved cash flow 
enhanced the company's ability to acquire resources to expand the 
business beyond traditional methods utilized in the industry at that time. 
A prime example of the McDonald's approach to the human resource 
element of inputs is amplified by the story of Fred Turner, a hamburger 
"flipper" at Kroc's first McDonald's restaurant, who came up through 
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the ranks and today is the company's CEO. Kroc recognized in Turner, 
an ex-military man, a dependable, responsible, and loyal individual who 
fits his standard for all employees. From inception, Kroc was cornrnit- 
ted to hiring the "right" employees. 
The other primary aspect of the early life cycle development involves 
building a credible public image. The original concept of the McDonald's 
restaurant revolved around developing a family-oriented atmosphere. 
This concept was basedon the hallmark phrase, QSClTLC (Quality, Ser- 
vice, CleanlinesslTender Loving Care), which exhibits the fundamentals 
of "a clean, well-lighted place, devoid of juke boxes, cigarette machines, 
pinball machines, or vending devices of any kind.. . " 'Our theme,' stated 
Ray Kroc, 'is synonymous with Sunday School, the Girl Scouts, and the 
YMCA. McDonald's is clean and wholesome.'"23 Of course, this image 
was well received by the public in the early 1960s when very few farnily- 
oriented restaurants were in existence. 
From the standpoint of the systems-resource model, McDonald's con- 
centration on the input acquisition functions early in the life cycle fits 
reasonably well into the Cameron-Whetten model. The company's suc- 
cesses in the early life cycle stages enabled them to survive and formed 
the basis for prosperity as the company matured. 
McDonald's Later Cycle Is Sophisticated 
One of the drawbacks of using the life cycle model as a basis 
for choosing a model of effectiveness is the inability to pinpoint the exit 
from or entrance to aparticular stage. However, inferences can be made 
as to which stage of the life cycle an organization falls into depending 
onits emphasis (i.e., input versus output). As McDonald's has matured 
as an organization, it is apparent that the emphasis of the company has 
shifted away from the input side of the transformation process. This shift 
in organizational emphasis to outputs reflects the company's entrance 
into the formalization stage, which is characterized by concern for effi- 
ciency, uniform quality of product or service, and productivity. Normally, 
as the level of formalization increases, the number of goals stated by the 
company increases. Harvard Business School Professor Theodore Levitt 
attributes the company's success to its having "created a highly 
sophisticated piece of technology by applying a manufacturing style of 
thinking to a people-intensive service ~ituation."~~ Clearly this view of 
McDonald's underscores the shift in emphasis toward an output orien- 
tation characterized by anefficient, standardized operation. Ray Kroc's 
central idea backing up this premise is embedded in the production of 
"an assembly-line hamburger." Some of the technological innovations 
which were utilized to improve efficiency include the introduction of the 
first computerized French fryer and computerized grill. Also, as pointed 
out in a previous section, the company employed smoothing techniques 
to improve efficiency by spreading out customer demand. 
In the McDonald's system all functions are planned and standardiz- 
ed throughout the units, leaving little discretion to the workers, 
managers, or owners. Standardprocedures, which are subscribed to by 
McDonald's units, are found in a 385-page operations manual covering 
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all aspects of running the hamburger business.25 To further control the 
output side of the business, McDonald's has set goals regarding the repur- 
chase of units currently owned by franchisees. By 1977 McDonald's had 
repurchased enough stores to directly control over one half of the total 
units in existence. Additional steps taken to standardize the McDonald's 
units have been achieved through the requirement that franchise owners 
and some managers attend Hamburger University where they receive 
training in equipment usage, products, business controls, interpersonal 
relations, equal employment laws, energy saving techniques, and safe- 
ty rneas~es.2~ Through the use of a computerized cash register system, 
the company is able to monitor and control the operations of the 
restaurants. These cash registers can be dialed up at night by the com- 
pany's main computer which accesses such information as total sales 
volume, breakdown of items purchased, and current inventory levels. 
Through this standardized approach, McDonald's is able to coordinate 
the activities of all of the restaurants, both company owned and fran- 
chised, so that customers can expect the same quality product regardless 
of where it is purchased. 
The company has also implemented strict energy conservation techni- 
ques. For example, many restaurants have installed sophisticated energy 
management systems that reduce the amount of energy used for heating, 
air conditioning, ventilation, lighting, and cooking.27 These examples 
represent only a small sample of the myriad of techniques and standar- 
dizations which have allowed McDonald's to achieve its official goals 
relating to number of units opened, sales growth, and profitability which 
could be identified in the annual reports dating between 1972 and 1983. 
Achievement of these goals has resulted in the "institutionalization" of 
McDonald's not only in the United States but around the world. 
McDonald's may be entering a new stage at the present time, an 
"elaboration of structure.'' The company has begun to establish 
"multipurpose subsystems" such as Ronald McDonald houses, involve 
ment in the Jerry Lewis Labor Day Telethon, and donations to the PBS 
television program "Zoom"; these current projects, over and above selling 
a billion hamburgers every seven months, demonstrate McDonald's in- 
tentions to monitor the environment and become involved in other 
aspects of serving the public. In the future, McDonald's may very well 
become a much more flexible organization than is currently perceived. 
With the application of the systems-resource model, this analysis of 
McDonald's fits the Cameron-Whetten model. 
Wendy's Grows Quickly 
Wendy's was established in 1969 in Columbus, Ohio, by R. David 
Thomas and his management team of franchise veterans. The 43 year- 
old Thomas was an experienced administrator of food service and fran- 
chised organizations; he spent 14 years with Harlan Sanders in the ear- 
ly years of Kentucky Fried Chicken, helping the Colonel establish and 
build the fried chicken empire. That was followed with a brief stint as 
vice-president of operations in the Arthur Treacher's Fish and Chips 
organization. However, as a self-avowed "hamburger man,'' Thomas 
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quickly left that position to open the first Wendy's in downtown Colum- 
bus on November 15,1969. 
Fast food market skeptics pondered Wendy's chances of survival as 
it appeared that Americacouldnot withstand another hamburger chain 
since experts like McDonald's were already adding breakfast items and 
other foods such as chicken to expand their menu in an attempt to off- 
set slumping unit sales growth. Indeed, most market observers believ- 
ed that the fast food growth rate had already peaked and that rapid ex- 
pansion was behind us in 1970.28 
However, Wendy's not only survived but thrived through the 1970s 
as America's fastest growing burger chain. This was accomplished 
through a strategy of providing a higher quality burger than was 
previously being offered by established hamburger chains. Indeed, 
Thomas attributed early company success to selling better hamburgers 
than McDonald's and Burger King, the industry leaders, at alower cost 
per Wendy's stressed quality freshness and a custom-made 
burger. Thomas, in fact, felt that Wendy's offered what he considered 
a "Cadillac hamburger" which could be made 256 different ways through 
the use of various condiments that other burger chains failed to offer. 
Along this ideal of a quality product, Wendy's hamburgers were fresh 
and onequarter pound beef compared to McDonald's onetenth pound 
burger. Even Wendy's other menuitems such as the Frosty, amilkshake 
like product, and chili were of high quality ingredients. 
The single, double, or triple hamburger, chili, Frosty, French fries, and 
soft drinks were all Wendy's offered. Thomas camed this belief, perhaps 
learned during his Kentucky Fried Chicken days, that it is best to do just 
a few things but to do them better than anyone else. Indeed, "quality 
is our recipe" was the slogan forever repeated in early Wendy's 
advertisements. 
Also adding to Wendy's growth was theinnovation of the drivethru 
window which seemed partly responsible for Wendy's doing more 
business than any other chain on a square foot basis in the mid 1970s. 
Customers using the drivethru do not take up parking spaces or fill up 
tables. 
Wendy's growth, as explained by firm president Bob Barney who was 
formerly associated with Thomas at Arthur Treacher's, would be 
tempered with an entrepreneurial spirit while carefully formalizing the 
organization and control as necessary.30 Indeed, Wendy's expansion 
strategy was based on a selection of committed franchisees who had track 
records of proven business successes. Wendy's management went to 
painstaking efforts to check out prospective franchisees. They only ac- 
cepted for potential franchise owners those with sound financial 
capabilities and those with a hands-on commitment willing to be involved 
with the actual operations of the store. 
Wendy's awarded franchises on an area basis rather than as single store 
facilities. Size and area population along with the francisee's experience 
were also considered in making franchise decisions. Wendy's charged 
an opening fee of $10,000 and also received income of 4 percent of sales 
from each franchise. Wendy's did not make any income from the sale or 
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lease of real estate or equipment. Nor was any income realized from sell- 
ing fixtures, foods, or supplies, although they did help the franchisees 
in gaining good prices for those expenditures. The sole income came from 
franchise fees, the 4 percent of sales charged each franchise, P from the operation of their own units, 200 of the 1000 stores in 1' 97. 
Since much of Wendy's income was tied to the performance of the in- 
dividual units, the company offered much assistance to the individual 
restaurant managers, including site approval of prospective locations, 
operations manuals, a training program at the company headquarters 
in Columbus, and promotion assistance. Thomas believed that Wendy's 
and the individual owners had the same goals, i.e., profits; therefore, they 
should all work together toward success. 
Wendy's growth through the '70s was nothing short of exceptional. 
Expanding to 1500 locations by the end of 1979, Wendy's vaulted to third 
place among the hamburger sellers in terms of market share, only trail- 
ing McDonald's and Burger King.31 
Not only did Wendy's open a lot of restaurants, but they also set pro- 
fitability standards for the industry. In 1975 the company realized an 
incredible 40.4 percent return on investment. In fact, Wendy's had the 
highest profit margin in the fast food industry during those times.32 
However, the times changed with the advent of skyrocketing beef prices. 
In 1979 Wendy's was saddled with losses. Their problem used to be their 
virtue: a limited menu of hamburgers and chili. With longer menus other 
chains could spread increased meat costs among more items.33 
Through the insistence of Barney, Wendy's recognized the need for 
an expanded menu and possible expansion into the breakfast and din- 
ner markets. Abandoning Thomas' earlier policies, Wendy's was the first 
tointroduce the salad bar. That was followed by chicken filet sandwiches, 
breakfasts, taco salad, and hot stuffed baked potatoes, all of which met 
with varying degrees of success. By 1983 Wendy's returned to top the 
industry in profitability; its success in broadening the menu was a ma- 
jor reason. "We have never rolled out a product that we later had to 
remove from our menu," boasted Barney. 
An advertising thrust of the 1980s also proved to be partly responsi- 
ble for Wendy's fine performance record. Always emphasizing higher, 
quality food than competitors, each advertising campaign proved suc- 
cessful. The now famous slogan "Where's the beef?" created a 27 per- 
cent increase in the number of people who think that the single is bigger 
than the top twocompetitors' burgers. Sales also increased but it is dif- 
ficult to measure how much of the increase is due to a direct effect of the 
ad.34 
Today Wendy'sunits number over 2,700, one third of which areunder 
Wendy's ownership; the rest are franchises. Wendy's operates at least 
one store in each state and in 12 foreign countries. Although expansion 
has slowed somewhat from therecord-setting levels of the 1970s, growth 
is still of paramount interest to management. A goal of 4000 restaurants 
has been set for 1990.35 
Wendy's is positioning for the long term through a reorganization pro- 
cess that saw Thomas relinquish day-today operational duties. The pro- 
FIU Hospitality Review, Volume 4, Number 2, 1986
Copyright: Contents © 1986 by FIUHospitality Review. The reproduction of any artwork,
editorial, or other material is expressly prohibited without written permission from
the publisher.
cess outlines a greater emphasis on marketing and efficiency of opera- 
tions. In 1983 a new building design was implemented to enhance 
marketing efforts and ease pressure from internal  operation^.^^ 
As Wendy's looks ahead to the goal of 4,000 stores and per unit sales 
of $1 million, up from $700,000, CEO Barney is emphasizing heighten- 
ed management skills and efficiency of operations, without ever losing 
sight of Wendy's overriding theme, "Quality is our recipe."37 
Wendy's Early Cycle Emphasizes Acquisitions 
Wendy's effectiveness in the early stages should be evaluated through 
the application of the systems-resource model. Consistent with this model 
is Wendy's emphasis on gathering resources and establishing a positive 
image. 
As Wendy's grew, increasing the number of units drastically in the 
1970s, acquisition of resources was of paramount importance. The in- 
dividual franchisees supplied much of the resources in terms of capital 
as Wendy's purchased none of the real estate or equipment for franchised 
locations. However, they did insist that certain guidelines be met as to 
store locations and operating techniques. Also, because most of the finan- 
cial burden was placed in the hands of the individual franchise operators, 
their financial capabilities were of great importance to the selection of 
the franchise operators. 
Wendy's, however, did not have a system to gather raw materials. 
These resource acquisition problems were transferred to the individual 
franchises. Owners of individual stores purchased the beef, etc., although 
aided by top management in securing favorable prices and storing 
techniques. 
Wendy's strength was in its establishment of a positive image. 
Through the establishment of a high quality custom-made hamburger, 
Wendy's was able to carve aniche in the older (18-49), more quality con- 
scious, upscale customer base. 
Later Cycle Stresses Efficiency 
Wendy's entry into the formalization stage of the life cycle was ushered 
in with a company-wide reorganization marked by Thomas' relinquish- 
ment of day-to-day management duties, which were assumed by Barney 
and a professional management team, which emphasized planning and 
brought in consultants to develop formal goals. Those established in- 
cluded annual increase in unit sales by 40 percent, increase in units from 
2,700 to 4,000 by 1990, and increase in advertising expenditures by 1.5 
percent of system-wide sales.38 
In addition, the organization took action to enhance efficiency. For ex- 
ample, the introduction of computerized cash registers supplied the com- 
pany with sales and marketing data and aided individual units with cash 
management control functions. The franchise management system was 
strengthened as procedures became more rigidly enforced. A manage 
ment training system was also instituted. Wendy's innovation of the 
drive-thru window improved efficiency by allowing the increase in 
customer service without commensurate increase in capital invest- 
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ment.39 Wendy's was in a position to offer new products without 
sacrificing its revamped operation. The company ',s menu expansions were 
based on whether the new item would affect the established processes; 
for example, the "Taco Salad" was introduced because the company was 
in a position to produce it without a large investment of capital. 
The goals discussed above have been set on amedium-range basis and 
cannot be fully evaluated at the present time. However, the company's 
focus on planning, hiring aprofessionalmanagement team, and the struc- 
turing of activities indicate a priority on efficiency. 
The Two Organizations Differ In Stages 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that both corporations follow 
Cameron and Whetten's model of how organizational effectiveness 
criteria change as firms develop through the life cycle. In theinitial stages 
of development, both were primarily concerned with acquiring resources 
and establishing a positive image. However, some distinctions exist, 
which have implications for organizational effectiveness in future stages. 
Wendy's early development was guided by the superordinate quali- 
ty theme, which established the company's positive image. This was in- 
herent in all aspects of operations, but was especially critical to con- 
trasting their product with industry leaders like McDonald's in com- 
peting for customers. In contrast, McDonald's positive image was 
developed with a family orientation. The organization was confronted 
with setting itself apart from the fast food restaurant typical of the late 
1950s. Even though McDonald's was forging new groundin the fast food 
business, the concept was accepted because it satisfied the basic customer 
need for a family restaurant. 
In the acquisition of resources, Wendy's was able to finance growth 
through internally generated funds, franchise fees and the customary 
4 percent annual sales charge. Therefore, the main consideration for 
capital shifted to the individual franchisees. Wendy's general lack of a 
system to acquire resources proved to severely depress the company's 
profits when beef prices climbed in the mid 1970s. This problem slowed 
the organization's progression through the early life cycle stages, because 
management was forced to reexamine and devise new methods of ac- 
quiring and marshalling resources. These factors led to an extension of 
Wendy's development in the early stages. McDonald's, on the other hand, 
had acquired an input system of suppliers from the beginning of opera- 
tions. Through reinforcing its suppliers, the company was able to buf- 
fer itself from possible material shortages. McDonald's was able to ac- 
quire capital resources very quickly through its purchase and leaseback 
agreements with the franchisees producing additional cash flow of 8.3 
percent of sales above the normal annual royalty fees. Because of these 
two factors, McDonald's matured into later life cycle stages at a faster 
pace than Wendy's. McDonald's was able toconcentrate on the formaliza- 
tion and standardization of procedures which facilitated the emergence 
of a very well thought out technological core. 
As these focal organizations matured, the emphasis on inputs yield- 
ed to an emphasis on outputs. Coupled with this change was an increase 
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in formalization and standardized processes. Once again, some distinc- 
tions can be drawn as to how the two companies achieved goals relating 
to efficiency and productivity. 
In contrast to the organizations at the early stages of development, 
very few distinctions exist in the methods employed to improve efficiency 
and standardize procedures. The common use of training manuals, train- 
ing schools, computerized equipment and information systems, and 
drivethru windows have all contributed to improvements in efficiency 
and productivity. One major difference between the two organizations' 
tactics involves increasing the technological efficiency of the units. 
McDonald's use of the breakfast menu has worked to smooth out demand 
over alonger period of time. Wendy's decided to produce a greater number 
of similar products employing existing technology in hope of smoothing 
demand out into the evening hours. The other major distinction is related 
to what the standardization is intended to accomplish. McDonald's con- 
tinues to focus on producing the ultimate "manufactured burger." Wen- 
dy's standardized processes, involving the use of compartmentalized, 
refrigerated delivery trucks and storage rooms, are intended to increase 
the usable life of its fresh products.40 
Both organizations developed along similar paths even though their 
processes produced different results. Therefore, the effectiveness of an 
organization depends in part on how well it solves problems given its 
operating purpose. The consideration of life cycle stages provides addi- 
tional theoretical backing to evaluate effective problem solving. 
The analysis demonstrates that the Cameron and Whetten model can 
be applied to real organizations. This model represents aviable alternative 
when performing macro-level organizational research by taking into ac- 
count life cycle stages and by acknowledging potential problems. 
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